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BEYOND ORWELL: THE APPLICATION OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
PAUL McBRIDE*
6I;;N THE FAR distance a helicopter skimmed down between
Ithe roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and
darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol,
snooping into people's windows."1 Many Americans may believe
that George Orwell's depiction of totalitarianism is something
that could never happen in the United States. Unfortunately,
some aspects of Nineteen Eighty-Four have very nearly become ac-
cepted parts of modern American society. In fact, in 1989 the
Supreme Court upheld police helicopter surveillance nearly
identical to the surveillance described by Orwell.2 In Florida v.
Riley, the Supreme Court determined that a police officer's na-
ked-eye observation into the defendant's greenhouse, through a
partially open roof, from a helicopter circling 400 feet above the
ground was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.3
While Orwell was writing Nineteen Eighty-Four in the late 1940s,
and even up to the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Riley,
helicopters appeared to be at the limit of aerial surveillance
technology available to domestic law enforcement officials.4
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
M.S. 2005, University of Maryland University College; B.S. 2001, United States
Military Academy at West Point. The author would like to thank his wife,
Shawnie, and his children, Matthew, Aoife, and Lorelei, for their love and
support.
I GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FoUR 2 (Plume Printing 2003) (1949).
2 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989).
3 See U.S. Const. amend. IV ("the right of the people to be secure in the per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.... "); Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-52.
4 Cf Riley, 488 U.S. at 462-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing a helicop-
ter capable of covert operations in a manner that suggests the technology either
does not exist or is at least unavailable to domestic law enforcement agencies);
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During the last two decades, however, the technology potentially
available for aerial surveillance operations expanded dramati-
cally.5 As new technologies emerge, the courts are called upon
to assess the technology's impact on constitutional protections,
particularly those of the Fourth Amendment against unreasona-
ble searches. 6 This comment addresses the potential applica-
tions of one particular technology, Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS), and its use in domestic surveillance operations. Part I
discusses the development of UAS technology and some mod-
ern applications of UASs. Part II considers the evolution of pre-
cedent regarding warrantless surveillance, particularly with
regard to aerial surveillance. Part III analyzes the use of UASs in
domestic surveillance in light of existing Supreme Court juris-
prudence and argues that the surveillance of the curtilage of the
home using UAS platforms is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Finally, Part IV concludes by noting that future develop-
ments may significantly impact the resolution of the
constitutionality of UAS surveillance.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS
OF UAS TECHNOLOGY
Although widely known as UAVs or Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
cles, the modern preference is to redefine the technology as
UAS. 7 According to one very basic definition, an unmanned air-
craft is "[a] device used or intended to be used for flight in the
air that has no onboard pilot."" Another definition demon-
Arthur J. Sosa, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Promises and Potential, in AY 97 COMPEN-
DIUM: ARMY AFTER NEXT PROJECT 53, 53-54 (Douglas V. Johnson II ed., 1998),
available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA346295 (explaining that the gen-
eral public was unaware of unmanned aerial vehicle technology until Operation
Desert Storm).
5 See generally, e.g., Melissa Deal, Comment, Can Big Brother Watch You? The Im-
plications of the Department of Homeland Security's Proposed National Applications Office
for Fourth Amendment Protections, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 407 (2008) (discussing dis-
semination of satellite imagery to domestic law enforcement agencies).
6 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (considering thermal-
imaging technology).
7 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-08-511, UNMANNED AIR-
CRAFr SYSTEMS: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE SAFETY AND EXPAND THEIR
POTENTIAL USES WITHIN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 6 (2008) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED]. While UAV is still a widely understood
and used acronym, this comment uses the term UAS exclusively.
8 AVIATION SAFETY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE, FAA, INTERIM OPERA-
TIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: OPERATIONS IN
THE U.S. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 4 (2008).
628
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
strates the diversity of the aircraft: "a powered aerial vehicle that
does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to
provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted re-
motely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal
or nonlethal payload."9 Because the aircraft itself does not need
to support a pilot, it can take on a variety of configurations, each
with unique and varied capabilities.' 0 The change in nomencla-
ture, from UAV to UAS, reflects the fact that in addition to the
unmanned aircraft, a complete UAS includes multiple pieces of
ancillary equipment, such vehicle control equipment, communi-
cations systems, and potentially even launch and recovery plat-
forms.11 The versatility of UAS configurations may in fact be
one of the strongest motivating forces behind the development
of the technology-the identification of new potential uses leads
to the adaptation of the systems. 12
Table 1. Illustration of Variation In UAS Design
and Capabilities
Northrop Grumman RQ-4 AeroVironment RQ-11B
Global Hawk (Block 20) 3  Raven
1 4
Wingspan 130.9 feet 4.5 feet
Weight 32,250 pounds (fully fueled) 4.2 pounds
Endurance 35 hours (maximum) 60-110 minutes (depending
on battery used)
Operating Altitude 65,000 feet (maximum) 100-500 feet (typical)
Range 12,300 nautical miles 10 kilometers
Velocity 320 knots (loiter) 14-44 knots
9 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-06-610T, UNMANNED AIR-
CRAFT SYSTEMS: IMPROVED PLANNING AND ACQUISITION STRATEGIES CAN HELP AD-
DRESS OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES, 5 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT: IMPROVED
PLANNING AND ACQUISITION].
10 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 7-8.
1' Id. at 6.
12 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FORCE STRUCTURE: IMPROVED STRATEGIC
PLANNING CAN ENHANCE DOD's UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES EFFORTS 4-5 (2004).
13 Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems, RQ4 Block 20 Global Hawk, http:/
/www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/ghrq4b.html (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
14 AeroVironment, Raven RQ-1 B Technical Specifications, http://www.avinc.
com/downloads/AVRAVEN-DOM_V10109.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
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A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UAS TECHNOLOGY
While UASs have only recently captured the attention of the
public, 5 the technology is far from new." At least as early as
World War I, military theorists recognized the value and poten-
tial of being able to remotely direct unmanned aircraft in com-
bat settings. 17 Until recently, however, most development of
UAS technology, particularly following World War II, was highly
classified and largely unheard of outside the intelligence and
military communities. 8 To a significant extent, modern public
awareness of UAS technology was a product of the war reporting
that occurred during Operation Desert Storm-for the first
time, the military applications and sophisticated capabilities of
UASs were displayed to the American public. 19
The initial efforts to prove the feasibility of UAS technology
occurred in the early 1960s following a series of international
incidents involving manned aerial surveillance of America's
Cold War enemies. 20 From the inception of the U-2 aerial re-
connaissance aircraft program, government officials recognized
that the ability to conduct manned overflights of Soviet territory
safely would only extend for the few years that it would take the
Soviet Union to develop technology capable of attacking the air-
craft.21 On May 1, 1960, this danger became a reality as the So-
viet Union succeeded in shooting down a U-2 with a surface-to-
air missile and capturing the pilot.22 The international embar-
rassment associated with the incident resulted in the termina-
tion of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and deprived the
15 Cf, e.g., IRON MAN, Ch. 7 (Marvel Studios 2008) (conducting a fictional anal-
ysis of UAS applications in aerial combat while showing a Global Hawk UAS);
TRANSFORMERS, Ch. 8 (DreamWorks LLC and Paramount Pictures 2007) (show-
ing what appears to be a Global Hawk UAS in operation but identifying it as a
Predator UAS).
16 Sosa, supra note 4 at 53-54.
17 ERIK K. SNYDER, U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, COUNTER
NARCOTICS MISSIONS FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 8 (2000), available at
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2000/acsc/00-165.pdf.
18 Sosa, supra note 4 at 53-54.
19 Id. at 53.
20 Id. at 55.
21 Letter from Edwin H. Land, Chairman, Project 3, Technological Capabilities
Panel, Office of Defense Mobilization, Executive Office of the President, to Allen
W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Nov. 5,
1954), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/stO3.pdf.
22 THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS: AN INSIDER'S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR
55-56 (2004).
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United States of intelligence invaluable to the security of the
nation.23
Although the government was actively pursuing replacements
and alternatives to the U-2 program before May 1960,24 the sud-
den termination of U-2 overflights left a gap in the country's
aerial reconnaissance capabilities: the U-2's replacement (OX-
CART) was not projected to be operational until the summer of
196325 and satellite imagery (CORONA) was still an unproven
and immature technology. 26 In July of 1960, perhaps as a way to
address the loss of reconnaissance capabilities until the OX-
CART or CORONA programs yielded operational results, the
government initiated a program, known as RED WAGON, to
convert existing target drones into unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft v.2  Although RED WAGON yielded limited short-term
results, possibly because of strong presidential opposition to
overflight missions of the Soviet Union 2 and competition for
research and development funding,29 the initial program set the
stage for future UAS development.
Two years after the imitation RED WAGON, the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis and the loss of a U-2 and its pilot to hostile fire over
23 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SITUATION ESTIMATE FOR PROJECT CHALICE:
FISCAL YEARS 1961 AND 1962 3-4 (Mar. 14, 1960), http://www.gwu.edu/-ns
archiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/stO9.pdf; Sosa, supra note 4, at 55-56.
24 GREGORY W. PEDLOW & DONALD E. WELZENBACH, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE: THE U-2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS,
1954-1974 191 (1998), available at http://www.foil.cia.gov/search.asp (search
"Search Declassified Docs:" for "Overhead Reconnaissance OXCART U-2"; then
follow "THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECON-
NAISSANCE; THE U-2 AND OXCART" hyperlink).
25 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, XXX-3945-62/A, OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIREC-
TOR (RESEARCH), 2 (1962), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAE
BB54/stl8.pdf. In actuality, the first operational mission of the A-12 did not oc-
cur until May 31, 1967. CLARENCE L. JOHNSON, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Ad-
vanced Development Projects, History of the OXCART Program 20 (1968),
http://www.foia.cia.gov/al2oxcart.asp (follow "document list" hyperlink; follow
"HISTORY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM" hyperlink).
26 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER, JOINT
MISSION COVERAGE INDEX, MISSION 9009, 18 AUGUST 1960 120 (Sept. 1960),
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/stl i.pdf ("Average
ground resolution is in the order of 20 to 30 feet on a side"). The August 18,
1960 mission was the first successful execution of the CORONA satellite imagery
program. REED, supra note 22, at 59. One-foot was considered high-resolution
imagery in the early 1960s. Sosa, supra note 4, at 56.
27 Sosa, supra note 4, at 55-56.
28 PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 24, at 195-96.
29 Sosa, supra note 4, at 56-57.
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Cuba sparked a renewed interest in UAS development."0 This
interest continued through the Vietnam War, during which time
the intelligence community used UASs extensively in a variety of
roles. 1 According to one source, "[t]wenty-eight different con-
figurations of UA[S]s flew from 1962 through 1975, involving
over 3,435 operational sorties. '3 2 While many of the UASs were
dedicated to reconnaissance over heavily defended areas of
North Vietnam (to avoid the loss of human pilots),33 others were
used to conduct electronic countermeasures missions, serve as
decoys, and to drop propaganda leaflets.3 4 Unfortunately, fol-
lowing the termination of the Vietnam War, realization of many
of the proposed additional uses for UAS technology was delayed
as a result of reduced support for unmanned aircraft 5 and re-
duction in force initiatives. 6
From the late-1970s until the mid-1980s, advances in domestic
UAS technology were limited. The successful implementation
of UASs by Israel against Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley during
the Israel-Lebanon war of 1982 however, instigated a significant
drive within the Department of Defense to acquire UAS plat-
forms.17 This effort, started by Secretary of the Navy John Leh-
man, eventually led to the development and deployment of a
3o Id. at 57.
31 Id.
32 Id. These numbers are representative of the development of UAS technol-
ogy during the Vietnam Era; however, they are likely "incorrect" considering that
many UAS programs were, and potentially still are, highly classified. Compare
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE PROGRAMS 2 tbl. 1 (1998) (omitting the
TAGBOARD drone, developed in conjunction with the OXCART program dur-
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, from the list of major UAS programs) with
Memorandum from John Parangosky, Deputy Director of Special Activities on
TAGBOARD Program for Deputy Director for Science & Technology (Aug. 17,
1967), http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp (search "Search Declassified Docs:"
for "TAGBOARD"; follow "TAGBOARD PROGRAM" hyperlink) (providing infor-
mation on the TABGOARD drone program).
33 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM: JANU-
ARY 1 TOJUNE 30, 1967, at 26 (1967), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
news/20030611/nsa-pfiab.pdf.
34 Sosa, supra note 4, at 57.
35 Id. at 58 ("In the Air Force, advocacy for unmanned systems was seen as a
vote against manned aircraft, tantamount to career suicide for senior aviators.").
36 SNYDER, supra note 17, at 8.
37 Id. at 9.
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variety of UASs, with varying degrees of success, across the dis-
crete branches of the military.38
B. PRESENT MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF UAS PLATFORMS
Unlike early military and intelligence community efforts to
develop UASs, currently the development of UASs within the
military is a joint service operation overseen by the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics." Under a system of centralized development, the mil-
itary is able to establish goals for development, such as increased
interoperability, more effective Joint Services interoperability,
and cost control, in order to ensure that future UAS platforms
meet the needs of the various military components.4 ° The con-
solidation of development activities allowed the Department of
Defense to field a variety of highly developed UASs, such as the
Predator and the Global Hawk, during the mid and late 1990s."
While the fielding of the Predator and Global Hawk were major
developments, the most significant growth in UAS deployment
within the military occurred because of the Global War on Ter-
rorism and the associated ongoing military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. 2
According to a 2006 Government Accountability Office re-
port, from 2000 to February 2006, the Department of Defense's
inventory of unmanned aircraft grew from fewer than 50 to over
3,000.13 Additionally, over eighty-eight percent of the un-
manned aircraft are considered small UAS platforms-in 2000,
the Department of Defense's inventory did not include any
small unmanned aircraft.4 4 Funding for UAS development has
also increased because of the Global War on Terrorism. 45 Be-
38 Id.
39 GAO REPORT: IMPROVED PLANNING AND ACQUISITION, supra note 9, at 2; U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: MAJOR MANAGEMENT Is-
SUES FACING DOD's DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING EFFORTS 4-5, 8 (2004).
40 See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS RoADMAP:
2007-2032, i-ii (2007), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/uas/docs/2007_Un-
manned-Systems Roadmap.pdf.
41 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 32, at 2 tbl. 1.
42 GAO REPORT: IMPROVED PLANNING AND ACQUISITION, supra note 9, at 5-7.
43 Id. A 2008 GAO report placed the number of UASs in the Department of
Defense inventory at over 5,000. GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra
note 7, at 9 n.3.
- GAO REPORT: IMPROVED PLANNING AND ACQUISITION, supra note 9, at 5. The
report defines a small UAS as weighing less than ten pounds and having an air-
speed less than 100 knots. Id. at 6 tbl. 1.
45 Id. at 20.
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tween fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2011, funding for UASs is
expected to grow from $323 million per year to an estimated
$3.02 billion per year.46
The recent dramatic growth in UAS capabilities has effectively
revolutionized the way that the military conducts its opera-
tions.47 The addition of the Predator and Global Hawk UASs
provides commanders with the ability to conduct extended me-
dium to high altitude surveillance and reconnaissance over
large geographical areas.48 The expenses associated with pro-
curing and operating the theater-level aircraft however, reduces
their availability to the commanders of smaller units.4 9 Addi-
tionally, the capabilities of the theater-level UAS platforms do
not always match the requirements and priorities of smaller
units." To meet the needs of the smaller brigade-level maneu-
ver units, the military is deploying additional systems, such as
the Shadow 200 UAS.5' Systems such as the Shadow give com-
manders on the ground access to real-time information about
the activities occurring within their area of operations.52 This
information may be essential to the successful accomplishment
of their mission. 3 With the planned continued investment in
UAS programs and increased deployment of the systems within
the military,54 it is reasonable to expect that the capabilities of
46 Id. at 7.
47 See id. at 8-9; cf. JoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, at 11-13 (1996);
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2020, at 8-10 (2000); Jason Dangel, Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles Play Key Role in Iraq, DEFENSELINK, Aug. 15, 2008, http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50821 (quoting MAJ Jonathan
Shaffner: "[i]t's hard to imagine combat today without UAVs. The aircrafts' capa-
bilities are continuously improving, and they are beginning to do a lot of the
same missions as our manned aircraft.").
48 U.S. Air Force, Factsheets: RQ4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System
(Oct. 2008), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13225;
U.S. Air Force, Factsheets: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System (Sept.
2008), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122.
49 Cf, e.g., U.S. Air Force, Factsheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft
System, supra note 48 (identifying the unit cost of the RQ-4B as $55-$81 million).
50 See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 40, at 21; Timothy Cof-
fey & John A. Montgomery, The Emergence of Mini UA Vs for Military Applications,
DEFENSE HOIZONS, Dec. 2002, at 1, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH22/
DH22.pdf.
51 See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 40, at 71.
52 See Dangel, supra note 47.
53 See, e.g., id.
54 U.S. Army, 2008 Army Posture Statement-Information Papers-Shadow
Unmanned Aircraft System, http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information-papers/
reset/ShadowUnmannedAircraftSystem.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
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UASs will increase and that the relative cost of the technology
will decrease.5 5
C. NON-MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF UAS TECHNOLOGY
As is true of many technologies developed by the military, the
civilian community has gradually begun to employ UAS plat-
forms for non-military applications. 6 Of the various UAS plat-
forms available, the Predator appears to have received the most
attention outside of the military. This attention is perhaps at-
tributable to the Predator's capabilities, such as its operating al-
titude, endurance, and ability to carry a variety of sensing
systems.57
Domestically, the most significant civilian use of the Predator
UAS is in border protection operations conducted by U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP) officers .5  During the first
seven months of operations, a single Predator operating along
the United States-Mexico border flew 886 hours and helped the
agency capture 2,300 undocumented aliens and over 8,300
pounds of marijuana.59 The CBP currently operates at least four
second-generation Predator B systems6° along the United States-
Canada border and along the United States-Mexico border.6'
The domestic uses of UASs are not limited to border security
however-many other government and private organizations
55 See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 40, at 4-5.
56 See generally, e.g., Mitch Waldrop, DARPA and the Internet Revolution, in
DARPA: 50 YEARS OF BRIDGING THE GAP 78 (2008), available at http://www.darpa.
mil/Docs/InternetDevelopment_200807180909255.pdf (describing the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's involvement in development of the tech-
nology that allowed the creation of the Internet).
57 See SNYDER, supra note 17, at 16.
58 See Press Release, US. Customs and Border Protection, Department Of
Homeland Security Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Operating in Arizona to Support
Border Security (June 25, 2004), available at http://wxw.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/news
room/newsreleases/archives/2004 press releases/062004/06252004.xml; Press
Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion Selects the "Predator B" as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platform to Guard our
Nations Borders (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/news
room/newsreleases/archives/2005_press releases/082005/08302005.xml.
59 John M. Doyles, CBP's New Predator B Drone Expected Later This Month, WKLY.
Bus. AVIATION, Sept. 18, 2006, at 132, 132.
6- GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 13.
61 Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Unmanned Aircraft Ar-
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have used UAS platforms in the execution of their operations.62
For example, in 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S.
Forest Service relied on UASs to study volcanic activity above
Mount St. Helens.6 3 Because the UAS was capable of with-
standing the extreme temperatures and toxic gases emitted by
the volcano, it could penetrate into areas where manned aircraft
were unable to operate.6 4 Other governmental agencies, such as
NASA and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Asso-
ciation (NOAA), have also used UAS platforms to conduct scien-
tific research. 65 Following Hurricane Katrina, local agencies
along the U.S. Gulf Coast used various UASs, although with only
limited success, to assist in conducting search and rescue opera-
tions. 66 Similarly, during the 2007 wildfires in Southern Califor-
nia, NASA deployed a Predator B UAS to assist with the
firefighting efforts.67
As UAS technology expands within the military sector, the po-
tential applications within the civilian sector also expand.6
Much of modern UAS development focuses on meeting the de-
mands of the market by ensuring that UASs are adaptable to a
variety of roles and that new technology is compatible with ex-
isting systems." In the future, organizations may acquire UASs
for a variety of purposes. The projected future applications of
UAS technology are wide-ranging and include such diverse ap-
plications as aerial photography of real estate, pipeline inspec-
tion, communications relays, firefighting, 70 and pesticide
application. 7' According to the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO), however, while a market for UAS technology will
eventually develop, the cost of UAS platforms in the near term
may be prohibitively high for many of its potential commercial
uses. 
72
62 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 10-11.
63 Id. at 11.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Jonathan Karp & Andy Pasztor, Drones in Domestic Skies?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2006, at B1.
67 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 10-11.
- See Terry Costlow, Pilotless Planes: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Use Grows Rapidly,
Versatility Improves, DESIGN NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
13909207.
69 Id.
70 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 14-15.
71 Karp & Pasztor, supra note 66.
72 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL Ac-iONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 15.
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D. LAw ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS OF UAS TECHNOLOGY
While an expansive market for UASs may not be generally
available for many years, domestic law enforcement agencies are
aggressively pushing to integrate the technology into their cur-
rent operations.7  According to an industry projection of UAS
growth from 2008 to 2017, during the latter portion of the fore-
cast period, more local law enforcement agencies could be inter-
ested in operating UASs.74 In the short term however, many
local law enforcement groups have already attempted to inte-
grate UAS capabilities into their programs.75 In 2006, the police
department of Pasadena, California initiated a field-testing pro-
gram of the SkySeer UAS. 76 Similarly, the Miami-Dade Police
Department is considering using a UAS developed by
Honeywell.7 7
As illustrated by the Pasadena Police Department and the
Miami-Dade Police Department examples, law enforcement in-
terest in UAS technology is primarily directed toward the acqui-
sition of small UAS platforms.7 8  According to the stated
intentions of these police departments, police officers would use
the UASs to assist in their tactical operations, such as hostage
situations or manhunts." The attributes of the small UASs
make them particularly well-suited to tactical situations. By be-
ing battery powered, rather than relying on an internal combus-
tion engine, systems such as the SkySeer can engage in nearly
silent operations.80 Additionally, the ability to fly at slow speeds
and low altitudes allow many small UAS platforms to loiter, if
not hover, over a location for extended periods.8' Finally, and
73 Id. at 14; Tom Brown, Spy-in-the-Sky Drone Sets Signs on Miami, REUTERS, Mar.
26, 2008, available at http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N19297979.htm.
74 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 14.
75 FAA, Order 1110.150, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Aviation Rulemak-
ing Committee, 1 (Apr. 10, 2008).
76 Pilotless Aircraft for Police; Crime: SkySeer Created to give Law Enforcement a Birds-
Eye View of Activity, LONG BEACH PREss-TELEGRAM, Feb. 4, 2006, at A4, available at
2006 WLNR 2215424.
77 Press Release, Honeywell, Honeywell Wins First Production Contract for its
T-Hawk Micro Air Vehicle (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www51.honeywell.com/honey
well/news-events/press-releases-details/11.4.08T-Hawk.html.
78 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL AcTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 14.
79 Brown, supra note 73; Pilotless Aircraft, supra note 76.
so Pilotless Aircraft, supra note 76; Octatron, SkySeer: Lightweight, Backpackable
Reconnaissance UAV (advertising brochure) available at, http://www.octatron.
com/brochures/brochure-SkySeer.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
81 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTiONs NEEDED, supra note 7, at 7; Brown, supra
note 73; Pilotless Aircraft, supra note 76.
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perhaps most importantly from the perspective of local law en-
forcement agencies, many of the small UAS platforms are de-
signed to be portable, rapidly deployed, and easily operated. 2
As explained by a representative of CHANG Industry, the
SkySeer's developer, "'[d]uring a burglary or manhunt, officers
can simply pop [the SkySeer] out of a tube, assemble it in min-
utes and launch it into the sky.' 8 3
While small UAS platforms will probably be an essential and
vital component of future police responses to dangerous tactical
situations, it is unlikely that the systems will remain confined to
such a narrow range of law enforcement activities.8 4 One addi-
tional potential use of UASs is their employment in targeted ae-
rial surveillance operations. For example, in 2007, a town in the
United Kingdom began using small UASs to "track criminals
and record antisocial behaviour." 5 Ultimately, many of the
same attributes that make UASs well-suited for tactical situa-
tions, such as quiet operation and the ability to loiter over a tar-
get, apply equally to the conduct of aerial surveillance. 6 As the
technology associated with UASs improves, especially increases
in endurance and decreases in operating costs relative to
manned aircraft, their desirability as general aerial surveillance
platforms will increase.87
This potential expansion, however, poses significant questions
regarding the legality and desirability of UASs as domestic sur-
veillance systems. While some people may welcome the intro-
duction of additional technology that may catch or decrease
criminal activity, others are significantly more apprehensive
about the widespread use of such technology.8 Regardless of
personal opinions though, the courts will ultimately have the fi-
82 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 7; Brown, supra
note 73; Pilotless Aircraft, supra note 76.
83 Pilotless Aircraft, supra note 76. The SkySeer vehicle is transported in a four
inch by forty-eight inch tube and the control station is contained in Pelican case
only slightly larger than a normal laptop computer bag. Octatron, supra note 80.
84 See Brown, supra note 73.
85 Philip Johnston, Police Spy in the Sky Fuels 'Big Brother' Fears, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), May 22, 2007, at 11, available at 2007 WLNR 9569476.
86 Id.
87 See GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 7; Johnston,
supra note 85.
- JAY STANLEY & BARRY STEINHARDT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BIGGER
MONSTER, WEAKER CHAINS: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY
2-3 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/aclu-report-bigger_
monsterweaker_chains.pdf; Johnston, supra note 85.
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nal say regarding the constitutionality of UAS platforms
deployed to conduct aerial surveillance operations.
II. EVOLUTION OF PRECEDENT CONCERNING
WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Throughout history, society's conceptions regarding "privacy"
and the courts' application of the term to the Fourth Amend-
ment have undergone a significant evolution.89 As Martin Kuhn
asserted, the Supreme Court's analysis of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment has progressed through four distinct
stages.90 According to Richard Posner, the Supreme Court's de-
velopment of multiple opinions on the issue can be explained
by the difficulty associated with identifying precisely what types
of privacy the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.91
When considering technological developments, the failure to
distinguish between privacy as seclusion and privacy as secrecy
has significant repercussions.
[W]hether wiretapping and police spying are subject to the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only privacy in the sense of seclusion or physical
privacy-in which event these methods of gathering material
should not be subject to the Fourth Amendment because, unlike
physical searches of a person or his premises, they are unobtru-
sive-or whether it also protects privacy in the sense of secrecy,
in which event they are clearly within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
92
In 1967, the Supreme Court significantly changed the juris-
prudence related to searches under the Fourth Amendment.9 3
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the con-
89 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Su-
preme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173 (1979) (discussing the role and interpretation
of privacy within the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
90 MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 112-13 (2007) (identifying the four stages as "[(1)] Fourth
and Fifth Amendment due process, [(2)] privacy as space, [(3)]privacy as se-
crecy, and [(4)] privacy as information control").
91 See Posner, supra note 89, 188-89.
92 Id. at 188.
(3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); cf. ALAN F. WESTIN, Ppm-
vACY AND FREEDOM 384 (1967) (predicting that "the Supreme Court will soon
issue a broad, path-breaking decision on the right to privacy from technological
intrusion").
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stitutionality of warrantless electronic eavesdropping of a tele-
phone conversation conducted within a closed public phone
booth.94 The Court's opinions are significant for at least three
reasons. First, the Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places" and that "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."9 5 Second, the
Court explicitly rejected the previous formulation of Fourth
Amendment protection, finding that the resolution of the issue
"cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion into any given enclosure."96 Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the concurring opinion written by Justice Harlan
provided a two-pronged framework for evaluating when a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment occurs.97 UnderJustice Harlan's
two-part test, to rely on the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment, a person must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy" and the expectation must "be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "98
Since 1967, courts have relied on Justice Harlan's test to de-
termine when the government has violated an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights. Generally, following the example of
Katz, courts apply the test to determine if a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.99 If a court
concludes that a search has occurred, it will find that it is "pre-
sumptively unreasonable" in the absence of a warrant. 00 The
test however, is subject to significant criticism. Many scholars,
including Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, have identified the cir-
cular and self-indulgent nature of the test. 10' As Justice Scalia
stated in his concurrence to Minnesota v. Carter, "unsurprisingly,
those 'actual (subjective) expectation [s] of privacy' 'that society
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' bear an uncanny re-
semblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court con-
94 Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51.
95 Id. at 351.
96 Id. at 353.
97 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98 Id.
9 See, e.g. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990).
100 Eg., Kyllo v. Unite States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
101 Id. at 34; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UN-
WANTED GAZE 60-61 (2000); Posner, supra note 89, at 188.
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siders reasonable. 1 °2 Based on his indictment of the test, it
should not be surprising that in Kyllo v. United States, Justice
Scalia's opinion moved away from Justice Harlan's analysis.0 3
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court considered whether the use of a
thermal imaging device to determine the presence of an indoor
marijuana growing operation in a defendant's home was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 10 4 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, determined that "obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the inte-
rior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technol-
ogy in question is not in general public use. '"105
The opinion in Kyllo represents a significant shift in the
Court's attitude toward technological advances. 116 Katz and its
progeny relied on the reasonableness of the subjective intent of
the party to determine if a violation of the expectation of privacy
occurred. Under the Katz view, if a defendant made informa-
tion available to third persons, the defendant lost their expecta-
tion of privacy.107 Following this logic, a variety of highly
intrusive government activities were held not to be a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 0 8 Additionally,
as technology allowed for increasingly sophisticated methods of
surveillance, a person's subjective expectation of privacy de-
creased.0 9 In his dissenting opinion in Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, Justice Powell acknowledged this concern: "[s]uch
an inquiry will not protect Fourth Amendment rights, but rather
102 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 96
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
103 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
104 Id. at 29.
105 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
106 See id.
107 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
108 E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) (determining that
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage, con-
tained in opaque bags, left for collection outside the curtilage of the his house);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (attaching a pen register to re-
cord all phone numbers dialed was not a search because defendant lacked an
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed).
100 E.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the defendant did not have "a subjective expectation of privacy in
the heat generated by his indoor marijuana cultivation" that was detected by a
thermal imaging device).
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will permit their gradual decay as technology advances."110 At
least as far as the home is concerned, Kyllo reversed the trend
established by Katz, finding that there were limits "upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy."'11
B. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
On three occasions during the 1980s, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the two-pronged test announced by Justice Harlan in Katz
to determine whether aerial surveillance was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 12 Each case presented the
Court with a unique set of facts concerning the specifics of the
surveillance; however, in each situation the Court determined
that a subjective expectation of privacy that society was willing to
recognize as reasonable did not exist.
In California v. Ciraolo, the respondent erected a set of fences
around his property in order to conceal the marijuana growing
in his backyard." 3 Police officers, acting on an anonymous tip
and unable to observe the contents of the backyard from
ground level, secured an airplane and flew over the respon-
dent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. 1 4 While flying over,
the officers identified and photographed, with a standard 35mm
camera, marijuana plants growing in a fifteen by twenty-five foot
plot in the respondent's backyard.11 5 The California Court of
Appeal, reversing the trial court ruling, determined that the
placement of the fences "constituted 'objective criteria from
which we may conclude [the respondent] manifested a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy by any standard.""1 6 The California
Supreme Court declined to hear the State's appeal." 7
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
California Court of Appeal.' The Court began its analysis by
110 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
III Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
112 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 209 (1986); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 229, 234-35.
113 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
114 Id.
115 Id.






noting that the respondent manifested "his own subjective in-
tent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricul-
tural pursuits." 119 The Court questioned, though, whether
manifesting a subjective expectation of privacy from ground
level observations necessarily meant that the respondent "mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observa-
tions.' 120 Because the issue was not raised by the State, however,
the court declined to address the question. 121
Taking up the second part of the test from Katz, the Court
determined that the question was "whether naked-eye observa-
tion of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating
at an altitude of 1,000 feet violates an expectation of privacy that
is reasonable.' ' 22 Answering this question in the negative, the
Court concentrated on the fact that the officer's observations
"took place within public navigable airspace. "123 Under the pre-
mise that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public," the Court
explained that
protection of the home has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home
on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individ-
ual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities pre-
clude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where
he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly
visible. 124
Because any member of the public could have flown over the
respondent's house, looked down, and seen what the officers
saw, the Court determined that the claimed expectation of pri-
vacy was not one that "society [was] prepared to honor.' '1 25
The Supreme Court issued its second opinion addressing ae-
rial surveillance at the same time as it issued its opinion in
Ciraolo; however, each case involved a significantly different set
of facts. 126 The second case, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
concerned the aerial surveillance and photography of an indus-
119 Id. at 211.
120 Id. at 211-12.
121 Id. at 211.
122 Id. at 213.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 213-14.
126 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35 (1986).
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trial facility operated by Dow Chemical.12 7 Dow Chemical, the
petitioner, claimed that by hiring a commercial aerial photogra-
pher, who used a precision aerial mapping camera to photo-
graph the facility at altitudes ranging from 1,200 feet to 12,000
feet, the Environmental Protection Agency conducted a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment. 128 While the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that
Dow Chemical's expectation of privacy was reasonable, the Sixth
Circuit reversed. 129 The circuit court concluded that because
the common-law curtilage doctrine did not apply to an indus-
trial facility, the case was more analogous to those evaluated
under the "open fields" standard and therefore the expectation
was not reasonable.130
The Supreme Court, affirming the holding of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, addressed a significant difference that distinguished the
circumstances of Ciraolo from the circumstances of Dow Chemi-
cal.13 1 In Dow Chemical, the Court concluded that the "open ar-
eas of an industrial plant complex . . .spread over an area of
2,000 acres are not analogous to the 'curtilage' of a dwelling for
purposes of aerial surveillance."' 132 In drawing this distinction,
the Court stated that "[t]he curtilage area immediately sur-
rounding a private house has long been given protection as a
place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.' 33 Differ-
entiating the curtilage doctrine from the open fields doctrine,
the Court explained that "'open fields do not provide the set-
ting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment
is intended to shelter from governmental interference or
surveillance.' "134
Having established the differences between open fields and
curtilage, and commercial facilities and private homes, the court
concluded that photographing the exterior areas of an indus-
trial complex with "a conventional, albeit precise, commercial
camera commonly used in mapmaking" from public navigable
127 Id. at 229.
128 Id. at 229-30.
129 Id. at 230.
13o Id. at 231.
131 Id. at 235.
132 Id. at 239.
133 Id. at 235.
134 Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)).
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airspace was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 135
The Supreme Court issued its most recent opinion assessing
the constitutionality of aerial surveillance in 1989.136 In Florida
v. Riley, the Court considered "[w] hether surveillance of the in-
terior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard
from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above
the greenhouse constitute[d] a 'search' for which a warrant is
required under the Fourth Amendment. "137 Similar to Ciraolo,
the situation in Riley started with an anonymous tip to local law
enforcement agencies that the respondent was growing mari-
juana on his property. 3 8 Additionally, in both cases, the respon-
dent had taken measures to conceal the growth from
observation at ground level. 39 Unlike Ciraolo however, the po-
lice officers in Riley conducted their aerial surveillance from the
vantage point of a helicopter circling at 400 feet and the respon-
dent had at least partially attempted to conceal the marijuana
from aerial observation. 40 Although it noted that Riley was anal-
ogous to Ciraolo, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished the
capabilities of a helicopter from those of a fixed-wing aircraft
and determining that the observations made from the helicop-
ter were a search under the Fourth Amendment. 41
Only two years prior to hearing Florida v. Riley, the Supreme
Court tacitly approved of the distinction between helicopters
and fixed-wing aircraft.'42 In California v. Sabo, the Court denied
a writ of certiorari in a case where the California Court of Ap-
peal relied in part on the distinction between the two surveil-
lance platforms and held that helicopter surveillance was a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 4 3 In Florida v. Riley, the
Court gave Justice White the opportunity to convert his dissent
135 Id. at 238-39 (noting that the cameras used produce photographs that may
permit the identification of objects as small as 1/2 inch in diameter).
136 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1989) (White, J., plurality opinion).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 448; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
139 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
140 Id.
14, Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d. 282, 288-89 (Fla. 1987) ("[C]ourts have recog-
nized that because of a helicopter's virtually unlimited maneuverability and ob-
servational capabilities, helicopter surveillance poses a serious risk to privacy."),
rev'd, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
142 See California v. Sabo, 481 U.S. 1058, 2201 (1987).
143 Id. (White, J., dissenting) (questioning the California Court of Appeal's
analysis regarding the distinctions between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft).
2009] 645
JOURNAL OF AIR LA W AMD COMMERCE
in the denial of certiorari into a plurality opinion of the
Court.1 44 Finding that Ciraolo controlled, Justice White noted
that, because a fraction of the roof of the greenhouse was uncov-
ered, Riley would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
from an officer seated in a fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1,000
feet.'45 Taking his conclusion one step further, Justice White
determined that because "'private and commercial flight [by he-
licopter] in the public airways is routine' 1 46 and the helicopter
was operating at an altitude not contrary to law or regulation,
any member of the public could have made an equivalent flight
over Riley's backyard.'4 7 Based on this analysis, Justice White re-
jected the contention that the helicopter surveillance was a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment and reversed the Florida
Supreme Court. 148
C. LIMITATIONS OF CIRAOLO, Dow CHEMICAL, AND RILEY
While the Supreme Court's decisions in Ciraolo, Dow Chemical,
and Riley certainly established that at least some forms of aerial
surveillance are independent of Fourth Amendment considera-
tions,'49 the opinions also introduced a variety of limitations and
questions that remain unanswered. Relying on the decisions of
the Supreme Court, a multitude of state and lower federal
courts have evaluated some of the considerations unanswered by
the three Supreme Court opinions; however, the results are
often inconsistent 5 ° and some have been implicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo.'5
144 Riley, 488 U.S. at 447. Justice O'Connor issued an opinion in which she
concurred in the judgment but questioned Justice White's reliance on the fact
that the helicopter was where it had a right to be. Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
145 Id. at 400.
146 Id. at 450 (quoting Ciraolo but adding "by helicopter" to the original text).
147 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
148 Id. at 451-52.
149 See supra Part II.B.
150 Compare, e.g., People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d 63, 65 (Colo. App. 1990) (finding
that helicopter surveillance at an altitude of 200 feet violated a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy) with United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding that even if the helicopter surveillance was conducted at 100 feet, it was
"not shown that flights at this altitude are so rare as to make aerial surveillance at
that level unreasonable").
15' Eg., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 1995)
(determining that the use of thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from a
house conducted from a helicopter did not violate a reasonable expectation of
646
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In each of the three cases considered, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the routine nature of private and commercial flight in
the public navigable airspace, thereby leaving open the question
of how the Court would respond to types of flights that are not
routine. As Justices Brennan and White stated in their opinions,
"[iln an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine," an expectation of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance by helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft is unreasonable." 2
Justice White, however, suggested that the ability to show that a
specific type of flight is not routine might produce a different
result.153 In Riley, Justice White stated that "there is nothing in
the record or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400
feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to re-
spondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that his green-
house would not be subject to observation from that altitude." '154
Justice O'Connor made a similar observation in her concur-
rence: "[i]f the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such
altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage
point generally used by the public and Riley cannot be said to
have 'knowingly expose[d]' his greenhouse to public view." '' h
Under Justice O'Connor's view, if a defendant can establish that
a method of observation was rarely used by the public, then the
use of that method by the police "would violate reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy. 15 6
A second question left open by the Supreme Court is how
courts should address the use of photography to capture images
of the curtilage of the home. In Dow Chemical, the Court consid-
ered the use of sophisticated, but commonly available, aerial
mapping cameras capable of producing images that could reveal
more detail than could be observed through naked-eye observa-
tions.15 However, the Court, in multiple situations, identified
that the opinion in Dow Chemical considered industrial facilities
evaluated under the open fields doctrine and not the curtilage
adjacent to a private home.15 The fact that in both Ciraolo and
privacy). Such warrantless use of thermal imaging equipment was declared un-
constitutional in Kyllo v. United States. Supra Part II.A.
152 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); accord Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
153 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156 Id.; see People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d 63, 65 (Colo. App. 1990).
157 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
158 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) (distinguishing Ciraolo
from Dow Chemical); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4 ("We find it important that
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Riley, in addition to making naked-eye observations, the officers
took photographs using commonly available cameras supports
the distinction between photography of an industrial complex
and photography of the curtilage of the home.159 In Ciraolo, the
Supreme Court even went so far as to expressly state that it de-
clined to reach the question of the constitutionality of
photographing the curtilage of the home.1 60 Additionally, in
Ciraolo and Riley, the Court was careful to phrase its holding in
terms of "naked-eye" observations as opposed to observations
generally. 61 While subsequent lower court cases have evaluated
the use of aerial photography, the cases either involved the pho-
tography of land located outside the curtilage of the home, 62
erroneously interpreted Ciraolo as an endorsement of aerial pho-
tography,1 63 ignored the use of photography in favor of the of-
ficer's unaided observations, 64 or addressed issues other than
searches under the Fourth Amendment.165
Going beyond the mere use of photography, the Supreme
Court hinted that the use of sophisticated technology might
constitute a Fourth Amendment search when used in aerial sur-
veillance. 166 The foundation for this possibility rests with Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Katz, where he warned that "reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as
this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expecta-
tions are most heightened.").
159 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209; Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 283 n.2 (1987), rev'd
on other grounds, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
160 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 n.1 ("Because the parties framed the issue in the
California courts below and in this Court as concerning only the reasonableness
of aerial observation generally without raising any distinct issue as to the photo-
graph . . . our analysis is similarly circumscribed." (citation omitted)).
161 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 451 (1989) (White, J., plurality opin-
ion) (noting that the officer's observations were conducted "[w]ith his naked
eye" and that "[t]he police officer did no more"); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 ("[I]t is
unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitu-
tionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000
feet" (emphasis added)).
162 E.g., United States v. Allerheiligen, Nos. 99-3144, 99-3154, 2000 WL
1055487, at *1, *6 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2000).
163 See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 276 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992) (erro-
neously stating "[a] erial photography from an aircraft legitimately in the airspace
over private property was held not to violate the Fourth Amendment in California
v. Ciraolo); supra note 161.
164 E.g., Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 283 n.2 (1987), rev'd on other grounds,
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
165 E.g., United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2008).
66 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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physical invasion."1 67 The Supreme Court's opinions in the
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical cases built upon this foundation. In
Ciraolo, the Court disputed that aircraft were "within the cate-
gory of future 'electronic' developments that could stealthily in-
trude upon an individual's privacy" but noted that "[a]erial
observation of curtilage may become invasive, either due to
physical intrusiveness or though modern technology which dis-
closes to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activi-
ties otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens. ' 168 The
opinion in Dow Chemical echoes this possibility with additional
specificity: "[ilit may well be, as the Government concedes, that
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally pro-
scribed absent a warrant. 169
In some respects, the Court's opinion in Kyllo has assisted in
the resolution of how courts should consider advances in tech-
nology. The Court, considering thermal imaging technology,
specifically noted the importance of the fact that Dow Chemical
did not address an "area immediately adjacent to a private
home, '' 7 but rather an "industrial complex, which does not
share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.""17 The
Court also clarified the statement in Ciraolo that modern tech-
nology could become invasive based on its ability to reveal inti-
mate details, explaining that "the Court's focus in this
secondhand dictum was not upon intimacy but upon otherwise-
imperceptibility.' 1 72 To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia dis-
cussed the lack of a connection between technological advance-
ment and the intimacy of the details the technology reveals, and
the problems intimacy poses if used as a basis for when a search
occurs:
The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath-a detail that many would consider "intimate"; and a
much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more inti-
mate than the fact that someone left a closet light on .... [We]
167 Id.
16 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215, 215 n.3 (1986) (internal quotation
omitted).
169 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986).
170 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
171 Id. at 37.
172 Id. at 38 n.5.
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would have to develop a jurisprudence specifying which home
activities are "intimate" and which are not. And even when (if
ever) that jurisprudence were fully developed, no police officer
would be able to know in advance whether his ... surveillance
picks up "intimate" details-and thus would be unable to know in
advance whether it is constitutional.1 7 3
While the opinion appears to establish that the use of technol-
ogy capable of allowing police officers to observe things other-
wise imperceptible to others through routine means may
constitute a search, the impact of Kyllo on the Supreme Court's
existing aerial surveillance jurisprudence is unclear for two rea-
sons. First, Kyllo addresses the interior of the home while the
curtilage of the home is the primary focus of the existing aerial
surveillance cases.' Second, because the Court has not consid-
ered any aerial surveillance cases since Kyllo, it is difficult to pre-
dict whether and how Kyllo will change the Court's analysis of
aerial surveillance. 17
5
Finally, the Court's opinions regarding aerial surveillance
leave open the question of what constitutes surveillance so "in-
trusive" that it becomes a violation of a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 176 Considering that the Court decided the three ae-
rial surveillance cases during the 1980s, the Court's analysis of
intrusiveness focused on those attributes commonly associated
with aircraft known at the time. 177 In his two opinions on the
subject, Justice White seemed to equate intrusiveness with sur-
veillance that disrupted the use of the area under surveil-
lance.17 In his plurality opinion in Riley, Justice White observed
that the helicopter surveillance did not disrupt the "respon-
dent's normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the
curtilage. As far as this record reveals, no intimate details con-
nected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and
there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of in-
jury. ' 7  To illustrate the questionable foundation of Justice
White's intrusive-equals-disruptive position though, Justice Bren-
nan created a thought exercise that described a hypothetical he-
173 Id. at 38-39.
174 See supra Part II.B.
175 See id.
176 Supra Part II.B.
177 Id.
- Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (White, J., plurality opinion);
California v. Sabo 481 U.S. 1058, 1058 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
179 Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (1989) (White, J., plurality opinion).
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licopter capable of stealthily conducting surveillance and asked
whether the plurality would "continue to assert that '[t] he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures' was not in-
fringed by such surveillance?""18 The Ciraolo opinion also dem-
onstrates the Court's inability to fathom intrusive surveillance
without disruption. 181 Referencing Justice Harlan's concur-
rence in Katz, Chief Justice Berger asserted that "[o]ne can rea-
sonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft
within the category of future 'electronic' developments that
could stealthily intrude upon an individual's privacy. "182 While
Chief Justice Berger may have been correct in his general inter-
pretation ofJustice Harlan's concurrence, it does not follow that
Justice Harlan intended to exclude an aircraft that is capable of
"stealthily intrud[ing] upon an individual's privacy." 183
III. UAS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS A "SEARCH" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL
AND UAS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, it is undoubtedly
well established that at least some forms of aerial surveillance do
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.1 8 4 As Justice White stated in Riley, however, "[t] his
is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from
an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amend-
ment."'8 5 Considering that the Supreme Court's current juris-
prudence on the subject is intertwined with conventional
manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft, any future argument for
the unconstitutionality of warrantless surveillance conducted us-
ing UAS platforms should attempt to differentiate the features
and capabilities of the methods in order to distinguish UAS sur-
veillance from conventional aerial surveillance.
Perhaps the most obvious distinction between UAS and con-
ventional aircraft is the fact that the UAS operates without an
180 Id. at 462-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
182 Id. (emphasis added).
183 Id.
184 See supra Part II.
-85 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
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onboard pilot or crew.'86 This fact has at least five significant
implications for UAS surveillance operations: (1) location of the
observer, (2) use of cameras to conduct surveillance, (3) ability
to conduct continuous operations, (4) covert rather than dis-
ruptive surveillance, and (5) restrictions on access to the na-
tional airspace system.
First, surveillance conducted with conventional aircraft re-
quires that the police officer be onboard making direct observa-
tions of the area under surveillance. With UAS platforms,
however, while the aircraft is operating above the surveillance
area, any police officer controlling the unmanned aircraft will
be in a remote location.'8 7 The operator's ability to conduct
surveillance remotely using a UAS is limited by the method of
communication between the control station and the UAS air-
craft.'88 Typically, provided that "line-of-sight" communications
are possible, the operator of a small UAS can be located many
miles from the area under surveillance.' 8 9 As the sophistication
of the communications system increases to permit beyond line-
of-sight operation, the distance from which the operator can
control the UAS aircraft increases.19 ° By using satellite data
links, operators are able to control some UAS platforms from
thousands of miles away.1 91
The second implication of the absence of a pilot is the fact
that while a police officer in a conventional aircraft can make
"naked eye" observations of the area under surveillance, UAS
surveillance requires the use of cameras mounted to the un-
manned aircraft. Although it is possible to equip the unmanned
aircraft with conventional cameras, at least a portion of the ben-
efits derived from the application of unmanned aircraft systems
are associated with the use of advanced electro-optical devices,
such as thermal imaging cameras, and other sensors. 9 2
Third, the absence of an onboard pilot allows for continuous
operations for longer periods than is possible with manned air-
186 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL AcriON NEEDED, supra note 7, at 6.
187 Id. at 7.
188 See SNYDER, supra note 17, at 11-12.
189 E.g., AeroVironment, supra note 14 (noting that the "Raven provides aerial
observation . . . at line-of-sight ranges up to [6.2 miles]").
190 See SNYDER, supra note 17, at 11 (describing how different communications
systems can be used to control the Predator UAS in line of sight or non-line of
sight operations).
191 Karp & Pasztor, supra note 66 (noting that some of the UAS platforms oper-
ated over Afghanistan are controlled by pilots located in Nevada).
192 See Coffey & Montgomery, supra note 50, at 7.
652
] UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
craft.193 While small UASs may not presently rival the endur-
ance of manned systems and large UASs, endurance is one of
the key areas of current research in UAS technology.194 As the
technology improves, small UASs could potentially meet or ex-
ceed the endurance of manned aircraft.19 5 Even though many
small UASs currently have a shorter endurance than manned
aircraft, the ability to deploy the systems close to where they are
needed may mitigate this limitation. While a conventional air-
craft may spend a significant amount of its flight traveling to and
from the surveillance area, a small UAS deployed close to the
surveillance location can dedicate a greater percentage of its
time to actually conducting surveillance.
The fourth distinction between conventional and unmanned
aircraft comes from the availability of alternative fuels and the
size of small UAS aircraft. Unlike conventional fixed and rotary
wing aircraft, many small UAS aircraft rely on batteries to power
electric motors during flight.196 Because of the absence of a
combustion engine, battery powered UASs are able to operate
with significantly less noise than conventional aircraft. 197 Addi-
tionally, the minimal size of small UAS aircraft makes them less
visible during flight.'98 Even small UAS aircraft that rely on
combustion engines for power still have the advantage of being
less visible because of their small size, and have smaller engines
that produce significantly less noise than the engines of full-size
aircraft.199 The combination of small size and relatively silent
flight enables the operator of a small UAS to conduct aerial sur-
veillance covertly. While it would be difficult not to notice a
manned helicopter conducting surveillance, 20 0 it is possible that
a small UAS could observe a single location for over an hour
without detection.20 '
193 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 7.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 E.g., AeroVironment, Dragon Eye Technical Specifications, http://www.
avinc.com/downloads/Dragon-EyeAV-datasheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2009); AeroVironment; supra note 14; Octatron, supra note 80.
197 E.g., AeroVironment, Dragon Eye, supra note 196.
198 E.g., id.
199 Cf OFFCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 40, at 73 (listing the
characteristics of the Shadow 200 UAS including length, wingspan, and power).
200 See People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d 63, 63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a
helicopter hovering at 200 feet generated "enough noise that numerous people
ran out of their houses to see what was going on").
201 See AeroVironment, Dragon Eye, supra note 196.
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Although not an inherent characteristic of a UAS, the absence
of an onboard pilot in UASs has led to one additional significant
distinction between manned surveillance aircraft and UAS plat-
forms. In 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indi-
cated its concern regarding the growing popularity and interest
in UAS technology and the potential implications associated
with the operations of unmanned systems within the national
airspace.2 °2 According to the FAA, a variety of groups, including
law enforcement agencies, proceeded with UAS deployment
under the mistaken belief that their operations were allowed
under the model aircraft operating standards contained in FAA
Advisory Circular 91-57.2o3 In its National Policy Order
1110.150, the FAA clarified its position on the issue and an-
nounced the creation of the Small Unmanned Aircraft System
Aviation Rulemaking Committee. 2 4 According to a 2008 GAO
report addressing the integration of UASs within the national
airspace, the development of regulations allowing routine access
to the national airspace system may take over a decade.20 5 One
of the main challenges associated with the integration is the de-
velopment of systems that will permit UASs to meet the safety
requirements of the national airspace system.20 6 Presently, UASs
are unable to comply with fundamental safety requirements,
such as being able to see and avoid other aircraft.20 7 Until the
FAA develops regulations that permit routine access for UASs,
agencies that wish to operate UASs within the national airspace
system must comply with a myriad of special permitting require-
ments managed by the FAA.20 8 This practice stands in sharp
contrast with the well-established requirements applicable to
conventional aircraft and pilots desiring to operate within the
national airspace system.20 9
202 FAA, supra note 75.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 GAO REPORT: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 4.
206 Id. at 3.
207 Id. at 17-18.
208 See generally AVIATION SAFETY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE (detail-
ing the special permitting requirements associated with the operation of UASs in
the national airspace system).
20- See generally FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, PILOT'S HANDBOOK OF AER-
ONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, ch.14 (2008) (describing the attributes and require-
ments associated with the national airspace system).
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B. APPLYING SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
TO UAS SURVEILLANCE
As the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement regard-
ing Fourth Amendment protections and home surveillance,
courts should look to Kyllo to determine the constitutionality of
warrantless surveillance performed using UAS technology. Fol-
lowing Kyllo, a court should hold that warrantless surveillance, at
least of the curtilage of the home, using UAS technology is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
therefore "presumptively unconstitutional. '"2 ' Holding that
UAS surveillance is a search by analogizing to Kyllo would not be
inconsistent with the existing Supreme Court opinions regard-
ing aerial surveillance. Indeed, such a holding would be the log-
ical outcome, as many of the issues addressed in Kyllo are
directly related to UAS surveillance.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court drew a bright-line at the door to
the home, holding that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technol-
ogy any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use. '"211 The Court recognized that "it may
be difficult to refine [the two pronged test stated in] Katz when
the search of areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, or
even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences is at
issue. 2 12 When considering the interior of the home, though,
the Court identified that a refinement already existed: "in the
case of the search of the interior of homes ... there is a ready
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable." 2 13
Despite focusing its holding on the interior of the home, the
Court stressed the heightened constitutional protections af-
forded to the curtilage of the home.2 14 While framing the ques-
tion presented in Kyllo, Justice Scalia reiterated that Dow
Chemical, which upheld the constitutionality of high-resolution
aerial photography of an industrial complex, was "'not an area
210 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
211 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
212 Id. at 34.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 33.
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immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expecta-
tions are most heightened."'2 15 This implies that although the
curtilage does not benefit from the absolute protection afforded
to the interior of the home, there is a close relationship between
the two, and that technology directed at the home and its curti-
lage will be subjected to a more skeptical analysis than would be
applied in a case involving open fields or industrial areas.216
Therefore, while naked-eye observations of the curtilage of the
home made from conventional aircraft may not violate an ex-
pectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable,' "217 the same surveillance conducted using cameras
mounted to a UAS airframe is likely to produce an opposite re-
sult. Applying the Court's analysis in Kyllo to answer the ques-
tions unresolved by Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley, bolsters the
conclusion that warrantless UAS surveillance of the curtilage of
the home is unconstitutional.
In reaching its conclusion in Kyllo, the Court focused on the
relative unavailability of thermal imaging technology to the pub-
lic. 218 Under Kyllo, the public's ability to use technology to re-
veal information previously considered private represents the
outer limits of what is acceptable in government surveillance.21 9
Referring to Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, Justice Scalia stated that
"the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public
view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncov-
ered portions of the house and its curtilage that once were pri-
vate. ' 22' These previous Supreme Court opinions presented the
possibility that the unavailability of technology to the public was
a factor for a court to consider in its analysis. 221 Kyllo, holding
that a search occurs when "the technology in question is not in
general public use," establishes this factor as an affirmative limi-
tation on constitutional surveillance.2 22
215 Id. at 33 (quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 467 U.S. 227 (1986)).
216 See Dow Chemical, 467 U.S. at 235 ("The curtilage area immediately sur-
rounding a private house has long been given protection as a place where the
occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to accept.").
217 Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
218 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
219 See id.
220 Id. at 34.
221 Id. at 39 n.6; Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238 ("[S]urveillance... using highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . ..
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.").
222 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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Considering that the use of UAS platforms is generally limited
to the federal government, particularly the military, and that a
public market for UASs is unlikely to emerge in the near term, it
is reasonable to conclude that for the foreseeable future, UASs
will be a technology "not in general public use. '2 23 Further-
more, the lack of regulations allowing routine access to the na-
tional airspace system weighs heavily against a finding that the
public generally uses UASs. Because of the lack of public use,
UAS surveillance of the curtilage of the home should be uncon-
stitutional in the absence of a warrant. In addition to following
from Kyllo, the determination that warrantless UAS surveillance
is unconstitutional because of the lack of public use is consistent
with the opinions in Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley. In these
three opinions, the Court tied its conclusion that the expecta-
tion of privacy was unreasonable to the fact that "private and
commercial flight in the public airways [was] routine. '"224 Con-
sidering the absence of "routine" flights by UASs, it is not offen-
sive to the established Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
aerial surveillance for a court to hold that UAS surveillance is a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
In determining that UAS surveillance is a search under the
Fourth Amendment, the implication of "general public use" is
not limited merely to the UAS airframe itself. Considering that
UAS surveillance relies on cameras, the public availability of the
camera technology is also a significant factor. While a UAS can
be outfitted with conventional optics, many are also capable of
supporting thermal-imaging systems, night-vision devices, and
other advanced sensors. 225 Assuming that these sensor systems
are not generally used by the public, the use of the sensors in
UAS surveillance suggests that the surveillance is a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes.
The necessity for cameras and, to a degree, the use of UAS
platforms generally, presents an additional reason to find that
UAS surveillance is a Fourth Amendment search. In Ciraolo and
Riley, the Court considered naked-eye observations conducted
during the aerial surveillance. 226 Although Dow Chemical ad-
dressed aerial photography, the Court expressly identified that
223 Id.; see GAO REPORT: FEDERAL Ac-rIONS NEEDED, supra note 7, at 13-15.
224 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 454-55 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239.
225 Coffey & Montgomery, supra note 50, at 7.
226 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
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it was not considering the curtilage of the home. 227 In all three
of the opinions though, the Court noted as significant the fact
that the surveillance did not reveal "intimate details. ' 221 Justice
Scalia however, directly addressing the Court's opinion in
Ciraolo, stated that the focus of the Court was "not upon inti-
macy but upon otherwise-imperceptibility. ' 229 Under this met-
ric, Justice Scalia concluded that, applied to the interior of the
home, the use of technology to "explore details... that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion"
was a search. 230 The recognition that naked-eye aerial observa-
tions of the curtilage of the home are permissible is consistent
with the reduced expectation of privacy associated with the abil-
ity to observe areas in plain view. 231 However, the general prin-
ciple of otherwise-imperceptibility should apply when
surveillance of the curtilage of the home goes beyond what is
merely in plain view-that is, subject to aerial observation with
the naked eye. When police officials use cameras and other sen-
sors affixed to a UAS airframe to see what they would be unable
to detect without physical intrusion into the curtilage, a court
should conclude that a search has occurred. 232
While the proposition of imperceptibility certainly should ap-
ply to cameras and UASs that permit resolution greater than or
different from what a police officer could obtain through naked-
eye observations, it is tempting to assert that so long as UAS sur-
veillance reveals no more than manned surveillance, despite the
lack of public use, the surveillance should not be a search. In-
deed, this would seem to follow from the Court's opinion in
United States v. Knotts. 233 In Knotts, the use of an electronic
tracking device was not a search because it did not reveal any-
thing that the public could not observe through visual observa-
tion.23 4 In Kyllo, however, the Court appears to reject the notion
that technology is an acceptable substitute for naked eye obser-
227 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239.
228 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001); Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
229 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 n.5.
230 Id. at 40.
231 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
232 Cf United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984) (discussing how the
use of an electronic beeper that permitted the law enforcement agents to "obtain
information that [they] could not have obtained by observation from outside the
curtilage of the house" was a search).




vations. 235 Responding to the dissent, Justice Scalia stated that
"[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be ob-
tained by other means does not make lawful the use of means
that violate the Fourth Amendment. ' 236 Under this view, the
mere fact that the police could make the same observations
from a manned aircraft does not legitimize the use of means of
surveillance that would otherwise be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether UAS surveil-
lance can ever be the functional equivalent of manned surveil-
lance. As previously identified, the inherent characteristics of
small UAS platforms permit them to operate and conduct sur-
veillance through relative stealth.2 7 This feature has two signifi-
cant implications germane to the determination that UAS
surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
First, the lack of stealth associated with conventional aircraft
provides an individual with notice-as a low-flying helicopter ap-
proaches, a person may be able to take measures to keep private
those activities that they do not wish to expose to public view. If
conducted through stealth, however, the surveillance may reveal
details that the person would otherwise keep private. This situa-
tion is closely analogous to the rejection of intimacy as a factor
in assessing the constitutionality of surveillance in Kyllo. 238 Us-
ing imperceptibility as the basis for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of technology, a police officer employing a UAS, regardless
of the type of camera, will be unable to assess the constitutional-
ity of the surveillance in advance. The officer will not know
whether the stealth aerial surveillance will reveal activities that
would be imperceptible using a manned aircraft until the activi-
ties are actually observed.
Second, while courts judge the invasiveness of a conventional
aircraft based on the aircraft's interference with the normal use
of the curtilage through noise, wind, dust, and threat of in-
jury,239 the invasiveness of UAS surveillance is grounded in other
considerations. While it may be true that the surveillance be-
comes more invasive as it becomes more disruptive, it does not
necessarily follow that it also becomes less invasive as it becomes
less disruptive. Justice Brennan, in his dissent to Riley, ques-
tioned this relationship: "[i]f indeed the purpose of the re-
235 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2.
236 Id.
237 See supra Part I.D.
238 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39.
239 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
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straints imposed by the Fourth Amendment is to 'safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals,' then it is puzzling why it
should be the helicopter's noise, wind, and dust that provides
the measure of whether this constitutional safeguard has been
infringed. '240 In actuality, one would expect that the opposite
considerations would be more relevant in determining if surveil-
lance violates the Fourth Amendment. Although describing the
"Panopticon" structure for prison design,241 Professor Solove's
observations could equally apply to UAS surveillance conducted
in relative stealth:
Those in the tower can watch any inmate but they cannot be
seen. By always being visible, by constantly living under the real-
ity that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the
effects of surveillance into themselves. They obey not because
they are monitored but because of their fear that they could be
watched. This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control. The
Panopticon is so efficient that nobody needs to be in the tower at
all. 242
The power of the Panopticon suggests that surveillance con-
ducted with UAS technology may be far more intrusive than
conventional aerial surveillance precisely because of the lack of
noise, wind, and dust. Although not directly addressed in Kyllo,
this tension is apparent in the Court's discussion of thermal-
imaging technology. Justice Scalia began his analysis in Kyllo by
stating that
[i] t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy se-
cured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.... The question we
confront today is what limits there are upon this power of tech-
nology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy. 24 3
Were the courts to conclude that UAS surveillance was not a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the "realm of guaran-
teed privacy" that applies to the curtilage of the home would not
240 Id. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241 The Panopticon is a prison design that places a guard tower at the center of
a circular building of cells. Each cell is open to the central tower and backlit so
that the guards concealed in the tower can easily observe the prisoners. A pris-
oner however, is unable to determine if he is actually being watched at any given
time. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 30-31 (2004).
242 Id.
243 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
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be shrunk-it would be eliminated.2 4 1 Just as the Panopticon
can create a culture of surveillance "so efficient that nobody
needs to be in the tower at all, '245 the possibility of UAS surveil-
lance could lead to an environment where individuals believe
that a UAS is watching them even when no UASs are in opera-
tion. This potential for indiscriminate stealth aerial surveillance
would render any expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the
home unreasonable, and thus remove it from the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. As the Court stated in United
States v. Karo, the "[i] ndiscriminate monitoring of property that
has been withdrawn from public view would present far too seri-
ous a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. 246
IV. CONCLUSIONS-THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
OF UAS SURVEILLANCE
Under the existing Supreme Court jurisprudence related to
aerial surveillance and the privacy implications of surveillance
technology, courts should determine that the warrantless UAS
surveillance of the curtilage of the home is an unconstitutional
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This
conclusion follows from a variety of factors, such as the rarity of
UAS use within the public sector, the ability of the technology to
perceive details that would otherwise be imperceptible without
physically entering the curtilage of the home, and the invasive
nature of UAS surveillance conducted through stealth. Unfortu-
nately, however, attempting to conclude what courts, once
presented with the question, will ultimately decide is speculative
at best. The foregoing analysis of the unconstitutionality of war-
rantless UAS surveillance presents at least one potential paradox
that courts will eventually need to resolve. So long as UAS
flights remain rare, the technology poses only a limited threat to
privacy within the curtilage of the home. However, if courts
continue to use the routine nature of public flight to support
finding that aerial surveillance is not a search, then as UAS
flights become increasingly routine they will (1) present an ever
greater threat to privacy and (2) be more likely not to be a
search subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. While the Su-
preme Court hinted at this conceptual problem in Kyllo, it de-
241 Id.; see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 533 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).
245 SOLOVE, supra note 241, at 31.
246 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
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clined to resolve the issue. 247 The ultimate resolution of this
concern may significantly impact the constitutionality of the
surveillance.
Analyzing public conceptions of privacy and reconciling them
with Supreme Court decisions, Professor Rosen noted that "the
real problem with the Supreme Court's test of invasions of pri-
vacy is not empirical but conceptual. ' '242 Professor Rosen and
other scholars and jurists have noted the circular or "self indul-
gent" nature of Justice Harlan's two-part analysis from Kat. 249
As Justice Scalia observed "unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjec-
tive) expectation [s] of privacy' 'that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable' bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable. 250
Professor Rosen takes a less generous view of the Supreme
Court's conclusions, stating that
[i] t's not surprising that Supreme Court justices, who are se-
cluded in a marble palace and have spent most of their careers in
the cosseted solitude of lower courts and universities, aren't terri-
bly good at predicting how much privacy ordinary Americans ex-
pect. . . . In many cases, people have an objectively valid
expectation of privacy that the Court, by judicial fiat, has deemed
unjustifiable. 251
These assertions, coupled with the fact that opinions such as
Kyllo, Ciraolo, and Dow Chemical were decided in a five-four split
of the court and the opinion in Riley failed to secure the signa-
tures of five justices, means that any shift in the Court's composi-
tion could significantly alter future decisions. It is entirely
possible that while a strong case for the unconstitutionally of
warrantless UAS surveillance may exist today, a future composi-
tion of the Supreme Court may reach an opposite conclusion.
247 Compare Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6 (attributing the issue to Ciraolo) with Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the potential conflict).
248 ROSEN, supra note 101, at 63.
249 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); ROSEN,
supra note 101, at 60-61.
250 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
251 ROSEN, supra note 101, at 62-63.
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